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As a body of rules and a basis for inter-State cooperative practice, international water law 
suffers from certain important shortcomings.  Most significantly, it is characterised by 
substantive normative indeterminacy, and from related deficiencies in its associated 
procedural and institutional frameworks, which retard its progressive development and limit 
its capacity to respond to the looming challenges of the impending global water crisis.  
Though it has evolved progressively in recent years to incorporate a far-reaching obligation 
upon watercourse States to adopt an ecosystem approach to the management of shared 
watercourses, this very development highlights international water law’s systemic difficulty 
in accommodating water management techniques which are critically important to effective 
implementation of such an approach and, ultimately, to addressing the water crisis.  Such 
techniques, with which international water law struggles, include multi-faceted benefit-
sharing, adaptive management, and public and stakeholder participation.  The latter two are 
considered essential for implementation of an ecosystem approach, while the former 
comprises a cooperative technique facilitated by an ecosystem approach, by means of which 
watercourse States might eliminate inefficiencies and ensure optimal utilisation of shared 
water resources.  These problems illustrate the urgent imperative of continuing to develop 




Ecosystem approach; benefit-sharing; adaptive management; public participation; 
  
 
1 Professor, School of Law & Environmental Research Institute, University College Cork, National University 
of Ireland, College Road, Cork T12 K8AF, Ireland.  
Tel. +353-87-2861055 





It is worth noting, in this 50th anniversary edition of Environmental Policy & Law, that the birth 
of modern international water law can be traced back just over 50 years to the seminal 
codification of key rules and principles contained in the International Law Association’s 1966 
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers.i  The contribution of this non-
binding guideline, produced and adopted by a learned association on its own initiative, cannot 
easily be overstated. It first collated the fundamental substantive and procedural rules applying 
in this sub-field of international natural resources law and has prescribed the basic format for 
international water agreements ever since.ii  Building upon this foundation, general 
international water law has emerged as a stable, yet inherently flexible framework, not alone 
designed to take account of the varied interests of watercourse States including, for example, 
those of upstream and downstream States and those of more developed and less developed 
States, but also proving capable of evolving in order to take account of growing environmental 
awareness and concern for human welfare.  Of course, such flexibility must inevitably result 
in a measure of normative indeterminacy and international water law has not in all cases 
provided a set of universally shared understandings upon which all watercourse States have 
been able to agree.  Whereas practically all States today accept the key principles of 
international water law, disagreement persists in certain shared basins regarding their 
normative implications and means of effective implementation.  
While such dissonance frustrates cooperative water resources management in shared basins 
where the application of international water law is contested, it has been more generally 
unhelpful by acting to retard the progressive development of this body of rulesiii in order that 
it might be better able to respond to the looming challenges of the impending global water 
crisis.  Though certain aspects of the practice of international water law appear to be evolving 
organically in the light of growing awareness of the fragility of watercourse ecosystems and 
the emergence of increasingly sophisticated methodologies to assist sustainable water 
management, this may not be enough to avert the projected increase in inter-State competition 
over shared waters, which could easily undermine progress made thus far in building an 
appropriate edifice of international rules to govern this sensitive area.               
This paper commences by outlining the looming challenges presented by ever-increasing water 
use, relentless and accelerating degradation of aquatic ecosystems, and the growing spectre of 
climate variability.  It then proceeds to summarise the current state of international water law, 
including a frank appraisal of its limitations and shortcomings, whilst attempting to identify 
certain necessary improvements which international water law may, regrettably, struggle to 
adopt.       
 
2. Looming Challenges in International Water Resources Management 
Few could disagree that the global freshwater crisis is increasingly acknowledged to be ‘the 
new environmental crisis of the 21st century.iv Population growth and changes in lifestyle have 
caused water demand to rise exponentially, with global water requirements in 2030 expected 
to be double those in 2005.  Notwithstanding the likely impacts of climate change, agricultural 
water use, which currently accounts for over 70 percent of total demand, looks set to continue 
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increasing sharply, as does industrial water use and demand for water in energy generation and 
cooling.  On this basis, most experts project a significant global water deficit in terms of 
projected direct human demand for water.v  However, many such projections fail to take 
account of the quantum of water required to ensure the effective functioning of the various 
ecosystems providing essential services on which all humanity depends. The serious problem 
of global decline in freshwater ecosystems has long been noted, so that ‘the rate of loss of 
biodiversity in them [freshwater ecosystems] surpasses that from other major biomes by a 
considerable margin’.vi This trend continues and may even be escalating, with recent data 
showing that populations of migratory freshwater fish have plummeted globally by 76 percent 
on average since 1970 while, more generally, wildlife populations found in freshwater habitats 
have suffered a decline of 84 percent – the starkest average population decline in any biome.vii 
Of course, increased human, agricultural and industrial use of water resources must also impact 
on water quality, further restricting the water available for particular purposes, especially where 
there is limited governance or capacity for effective pollution control or wastewater treatment. 
The expected impacts of climate change can only exacerbate the freshwater crisis, with 
increases in global temperatures, changing precipitation patterns and the melting of glacial 
‘water towers’ likely to increase stress on water resources, especially in many of the most 
populous and least capacitated States.  In addition, rising sea levels and increases in the 
frequency and severity of storms and flood events are also expected to impact upon the 
availability of freshwater and the management of shared watercourses.        
It is vital, therefore, that the cooperative framework provided by international water law 
compels State actors to bear in mind that water, though renewable, remains a finite resource 
subject to the natural limits of the hydrological cycle and, further, that the parameters of the 
hydrological cycle are likely to alter markedly in response to climate variability.  Generally, 
there is increasing concern that competition will inevitably intensify between co-basin States 
for the right to use shared transboundary water resources due to ‘local water crises caused by 
our use of water at rates faster than local hydro-cycles replenish, in other words, unsustainable 
water use’.viii As one leading commentator suggests regarding the implications for international 
water law of such imminent challenges: 
‘The traditional legal principles upon which existing water management is based will likely 
be insufficient to deal with the water problems that loom from projected climate change, 
population growth, food production, increased industrialization, and ecosystem needs. 
While water law has evolved significantly over the past century, it will need to change 
further to address these challenges.’ix   
 
3. The Current Position in International Water Law 
The relatively recently codified corpus of modern international law regarding the utilisation of 
shared international water resources is already quite well settled around three key rules: the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation,x widely regarded as the overarching cardinal 
rule in the field; the duty to prevent significant transboundary harm;xi and the duty to cooperate 
in the management of shared waters.xii  Though the UN Watercourses Convention, the first 
global conventional instrument in the field, was adopted by the UN General Assembly in June 
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1997, but only obtained the 35 ratifications required to enter into force in August 2014, 
watercourse States’ reticence was more due to questions regarding relative primacy, emphasis 
and nuance than to fundamental disagreement over the central rules articulated therein.  The 
first two of these key rules are understood as creating the core substantive obligations for 
watercourse States, the effective implementation of which infers a range of related, ancillary 
normative requirements including procedural rules to facilitate inter-State communication.xiii  
The duty to cooperate can be regarded as a composite obligation comprising a comprehensive 
suite of such procedural requirements, including the duty to exchange information relevant to 
use of the watercourse, the duty to notify co-riparian States of planned projects potentially 
impacting a shared watercourse and, where necessary, duties to consult and negotiate with such 
States in a good faith effort to address their concerns.  There have also emerged related 
substantive rules, principles and standards which further inform the applicable due diligence 
standards inherent to the three core rules.  These notably include duties relating to the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution of transboundary waters and concerning the 
maintenance and conservation of riverine ecosystems.xiv 
Despite this trend towards the convergence of international water law around three basic, yet 
broad and flexible principles, this body of rules remains dynamic and is continuously 
interacting with, and being shaped by, other prolific and highly pervasive field of normativity, 
including international environmental law, international human rights law and international 
investment law.
xviii
xv  While the central relevance of environmental values to transboundary water 
use and management has long been apparent, the social protection values inherent to equitable 
and reasonable utilisation are increasingly pronounced.  In particular, the priority routinely 
accorded to safeguarding ‘vital human needs’ related to the use of shared water resources, have 
become very closely intertwined with the discourse on the human right to water ongoing in 
international human rights law.xvi  Such values are further emphasised by the universally 
adopted efforts to realise Sustainable Development Goal 6 on clean water and sanitation for 
all.xvii  Of course, the practice of international water law is commonly concerned with major 
investment projects, often involving foreign private or public sector investors, and often having 
the potential to impact upon the environment of an international watercourse, upon a co-basin 
State’s right to utilise the waters in question, or upon local people’s access to adequate water 
resources or other ecosystem services.  Thus, tensions may arise with normative frameworks 
established in the field of international economic law concerning the legal protection of foreign 
investors  or concerning compliance with the environmental and social safeguard policies of 
multilateral development banks or other international financial institutions.xix          
It has long been recognised that international water law, as a flexible normative framework 
requiring the equitable balancing of the diverse legitimate interests of basin States, must 
inevitably involve intense inter-State procedural engagement, which can only be effectively 
facilitated by the establishment of permanent, technically competent institutional machinery.  
The pivotal role of such institutional mechanisms in ensuring effective inter-State 
communication and, thereby, giving effect to any conception of equitable and reasonable 
utilisation was acknowledged in Recommendation 51 of the Action Plan for the Human 
Environment adopted at the seminally important 1972 Stockholm Conference, which called for 
the ‘creation of river basin commissions or other appropriate machinery for cooperation 
between interested States for water resources common to more than one jurisdiction’, and set 
down a number of basic principles by which the establishment of such bodies should be 
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guided.xx  Although such institutional structures can take quite diverse forms and may enjoy 
varying functional mandates and capacity, there today exists at least 119 river basin 
organisations (RBOs) performing an extensive range of coordination and joint management 
roles.xxi  Such reliance on inter-State institutional mechanisms and the taking of a so-called 
‘common management’ approach to international water resources demonstrates a considerable 
degree of commitment to achieving equitable and reasonable utilisation and recognition of the 
existence of a community of interest among co-basin States.xxii     
Despite the relatively settled nature of international water law, recent years have witnessed 
significant progressive evolution in the field, particularly regarding the continuing elaboration 




  Though the 1992 UNECE Water Convention and the 1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention both included express obligations to protect watercourse ecosystems, this 
commitment was largely aspirational, and its normative implications were but poorly 
understood.  In the meantime, however, ever greater scientific understanding of how ‘the use 
of watercourses can affect and be affected by processes related to other natural elements, such 
as soil degradation and desertification, deforestation and climate change’, has led key actors to 
advocate and adopt a so-called “ecosystem approach”,xxiv which stresses interconnectedness 
between living species and their physical environments and implies holistic, spatially 
expansive management approaches recognising the need to maintain ‘ecosystem integrity’.xxv  
This evolution in scientific understanding of river basins as ecosystems continues, as reflected 
in the emergence of sophisticated methodologies which function to inform the normative 
implications of State obligations to protect watercourse ecosystems.  For example, improved 
techniques for analysing environmental flows in a shared watercourse have allowed judicial 
recognition of a corresponding legal obligation to maintain a minimum environmental flow 
regime,xxvi and judicial confirmation that interference with the minimum environmental flow 
of an international watercourse may now be regarded as significant transboundary harm.   
Similarly, the rapidly evolving ecosystem services concept provides a methodological 
framework for the economic and social valuation of natural ecosystems and the services 
provided thereby, permitting integration of both marketable and non-marketable watercourse-
related benefits into decision-making processes regarding water utilisation.  Indeed, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recently determined that ‘damage to the environment, 
and the consequent impairment or loss of the ability of the environment to provide goods and 
services, is compensable under international law’.   In addition, lessons learned in the 
implementation of related environmental regimes may also inform obligations regarding 
international watercourse ecosystems.  For example, detailed guidance developed under the 
1971 Ramsar Conventionxxix can assist in informing the ecosystem obligations arising in 
international water law, as wetlands play a critical role in the functioning of aquatic ecosystems 
and the provision of important ecosystem services, such as water resources retention and 
purification, food provision, flood control, wildlife habitat and groundwater recharge.xxx  
Notwithstanding such progress, however, the challenge of protecting and preserving 
international watercourse ecosystems has served to highlight further the deficiencies of 
international water law and its inadequacy for addressing the looming global water crisis.          
   
4. Systemic Deficiencies in International Water Law 
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Despite broad consensus on the key principles and approaches set out under international water 
law, it has long been clear that this body of rules suffers from systemic shortcomings which 
limit its current effectiveness in determining each State’s entitlement to the benefits of the 
watercourse and the standard of State behaviour expected. These shortcomings, which are also 
likely to limit the utility of international water law in addressing the looming water crisis, 
include its limited incorporation into and lack of coherence with national legal frameworks and 
its general lack of effective enforceability.  However, the key difficulty with international water 
law is that of its normative indeterminacy, as ‘specific mechanisms for operationalization 




xxxi  Though equitable and reasonable 
utilisation requires consideration of an open-ended list of relevant factors, ‘[t]he weight of the 
factors is somewhat elusive: there is no hierarchical list to be considered and no consensus on 
where to focus greater weight’,  so that this key principle ‘is thus prone to subjective 
interpretation’.   Therefore, consistent with the UN Watercourses Convention’s role as a 
framework convention, ‘the operationalization of Article 6 [listing the factors relevant to 
equitable and reasonable utilisation] relies on a deliberative process by each state to establish 
“importance” and “weight”.’  To add to this uncertainty regarding the relative significance 
of each relevant factor, it is clear that they  
‘cannot be treated as definitive and considered in isolation from all other aspects of 
governance, they must be used in the context of the watercourse, the prevailing situation 
of concerned riparians and their populations, and in harmony with other law and policy 
frameworks to adapt to the context of the watercourse in which they are being 
applied.’xxxv      
Similar uncertainty afflicts the generally applicable obligation for watercourse States to ‘take 





  Not alone is there continuing disagreement and confusion amongst State actors 
regarding the normative implications of its purported subordination to the principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilisation,  but both the significance threshold for harm coming within the 
scope of the no-harm rule and the due diligence standard of conducted expected of watercourse 
States thereunder are understood to be highly context-related.   Even if one accepts that 
such due diligence is linked to equitable and reasonable use, so that the normative implications 
of the prohibition on causing significant harm must be understood taking account of the factors 
listed as relevant to equitable and reasonable utilisation,  the duty of prevention remains 
subject to the normative uncertainty inherent to these factors.     
Therefore, the basic principles outlined above provide little more than a foundation for the 
development of more elaborate, basin-specific substantive and procedural frameworks for 
cooperation, ideally through the conclusion of watercourse agreements which accommodate 
the particular geophysical, political, social, economic and environmental characteristics of each 
basin.xl  Unfortunately, not all watercourses are covered by such basin-level agreements and, 
even where they do exist, not all riparian States see any advantage in acceding thereto.  Indeed, 
whereas the benefits of closer basin-level cooperation and resulting water resources 
optimisation ought to be ever more apparent, the number of watercourse agreements concluded 
by basin States has slowed sharply in recent years.xli  This lack of legal certainty and 
predictability undermines the authority of international water law, so that watercourse States 
often act unilaterally in the pursuit of their own short-term and narrowly self-interested 
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sovereign objectives.  As one commentator points out, ‘[t]he most powerful riparians are often 
willing to take unilateral action, as the risk that their action will be subsequently found 
inequitable and unreasonable is rather low’.
xliii
xlii  Thus, normative uncertainty provides the 
vacuum within which narrow considerations of sovereignty tend to arise and thrive in 
transboundary water management, thereby undermining the development or implementation of 
further, more elaborate rules of cooperation.  In this way ‘many international water treaties 
remain dead-letter regimes – in some cases negotiated with good intentions, but ineffective in 
reality’.   This problem can be illustrated by a brief examination of three key areas in which 
current international water law and practice is found to be wanting.     
4.1 Benefit-Sharing 
Normative uncertainty has severely hindered the development and adoption by basin States of 
broad-based, cross-sectoral benefit-sharing arrangements, which would otherwise offer a 
potential means of reconciling upstream and downstream positions, as well as other conflicting 
interests in the use of shared waters.  Benefit-sharing may be defined to include ‘any action 
designed to change the allocation of costs and benefits associated with cooperation’ which, in 
most cases, ‘will require some form of redistribution or compensation’.
xlvii
xliv  Benefit-sharing 
arrangements would typically involve some form of payments for benefits, or compensation 
for costs, associated with enhanced stewardship of a shared transboundary watercourse 
normally undertaken by an upstream state.  In the vast majority of situations where the simple 
allocation of a quantum share of water would prove inefficient or otherwise inappropriate, 
benefit-sharing arrangements might permit riparian States to cooperate in taking a basin-wide 
approach in order to optimize benefits and allocate costs, by providing a framework for the 
equitable sharing of those benefits and costs.  By facilitating broad issue-linkage, such 
arrangements can greatly enhance the range and scope of cooperative initiatives in which states 
might engage.  In addition to benefits directly connected to water resources utilisation, such as 
irrigated food production or hydropower generation, benefit-sharing arrangements might also 
take account of benefits not directly related to water use.  They would generally aim to optimise 
beneficial water use so as to maximise welfare and facilitate sustainable utilisation and 
equitable sharing of water-related benefits.xlv  In other words, benefit-sharing ‘enlarges the 
pie’,xlvi aiming at ‘the achievement of regional water security through cost-sharing rather than 
inefficient duplicate development’.     
One might reasonably expect that the emergence of widely accepted methodologies regarding 
the identification and valuation of ecosystem services would support greater resort to benefit-
sharing, particularly by means of arrangements designed to optimise the mutual benefit enjoyed 
by watercourse States through the preservation of watercourse ecosystems and the maintenance 
of the services provided thereby.  However, this does not appear to be occurring.  Due to the 
inherent complexity of the considerations and calculations involved in benefit-sharing, such 
arrangements require a sophisticated legal and institutional framework for cooperation.xlviii  
Strong cooperative institutions with appropriately broad mandates and adequate technical 
capacity can undertake cooperative regional assessments which may serve as a ‘common point 
of departure’, whilst also facilitating the intense, regular and structured exchange of data and 
information required ‘in order to build trust and catalyse cooperation’.xlix  Research suggests 
that failure to agree and implement benefit sharing arrangements in opportune situations can 
often be blamed largely on the lack of appropriate binding legal and competent institutional 
arrangements.l  Nevertheless, watercourse States have consistently proven reluctant to establish 
such strong institutions, lest this might limit their sovereign freedom of action regarding shared 
water resources, and so successful examples of benefit-sharing remain few and far between.li  
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Thus, while the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation is sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate, and may in certain circumstances even require, sophisticated benefit-sharing 
amongst watercourse States, its inherent normative uncertainty serves to amplify States’ 
sovereign reluctance to cooperate and, thereby, to discourage such arrangements which might 
otherwise maximise efficiency and optimise overall beneficial use of shared waters.lii  As 
problems of water scarcity and ecosystems degradation intensify, this situation will become 
increasingly untenable.     
It is quite clear that the difficult task of crafting complex benefit-sharing arrangements, as well 
as their effective implementation and management over time, will require a regime of ongoing 
intense and highly technical inter-State engagement which is utterly beyond the capacity of the 
procedural rules and institutional structures currently found in international water law.  The 
currently established legal and institutional frameworks for cooperation have largely evolved 
to facilitate “one-time” notification, consultation and negotiation in respect of the unilateral 
implementation of large-scale infrastructure or water utilisation projects. To date, such inter-
State engagement has tended to be based upon front-loaded technical assessments of the 
impacts of the planned projects in question and of the interests of the States concerned, which 
are intended to inform national permitting decisions.liii  
 
4.2 Adaptive Management 
Similarly, international water law appears ill suited to employ adaptive management techniques 
in order to respond to the challenges presented by climate change, as well as to the ongoing 
problem of biodiversity loss.
lviii
liv  Adaptive management is one of the key mechanisms for 
implementing an ecosystem approach and involves a strategy that is ‘iterative and flexible, 
responsive to the constantly changing conditions of both complex ecosystem processes and 
available scientific knowledge’.lv  Adaptive management is necessary to cope with 
fundamental uncertainty regarding the functioning of complex dynamic socio-ecological 
systems, the value of certain ecosystems and their services, and the potential effects of certain 
policies and projects on the functioning of ecosystems.lvi  One can expect such uncertainty to 
be exacerbated, and adaptive strategies to become ever more necessary, in light of the threat of 
climate variability to freshwater ecosystems.lvii  Stated simply, adaptive management seeks to 
ensure the “resilience” of an ecosystem, i.e. ‘the ability of a system to cope with inevitable 
changes [which] is, thus, the precondition for the health of that system’,  by adopting a 
systematic approach for adapting and improving natural resources management by learning 
from previous management interventions.lix 
However, beyond the intrinsic flexibility of the normatively indeterminate principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation, incorporation of adaptive measures into conventional 
systems of legal rules is problematic, largely due to traditional prioritization of the stability of 
legal regimes over their flexibility, especially where such regimes are intended to facilitate 
investment in large-scale water infrastructure. Thus, States are reluctant to surrender sovereign 
control of shared water resources to the broadly mandated joint institutions that would 
necessarily be charged with implementing adaptive management.lx  Traditional legal 
frameworks for natural resources management tend to be ‘based on historic conditions and 
linear patterns of change’, whereas ‘[t]he complex and uncertain dynamics of interconnected 
ecosystems and social systems … require that resource regulators and managers have a certain 
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amount of discretion’,lxi something that is not often afforded to cooperative transboundary 
institutions (where they exist) by watercourse States concerned to maintain sovereign freedom 
of action. 
The procedural rules of international water law are most firmly established, and most highly 
elaborated, in respect of planned measures, where conventional instruments provide for inter-
State notification and, where necessary, for structured consultation and negotiation.
lxiii
lxii  It is 
quite clear that the outcomes traditionally produced by inter-State procedural engagement in 
respect of large-scale water-related utilisation or infrastructure projects have sought to ensure 
legal stability above all else. This is evident from judicial recognition of the critically 
significant role played in the effective implementation of such procedural engagement (and, by 
extension, in giving effect to the substantive rules of international water law) by environmental 
impact assessment (EIA), itself a one-time, front-loaded process which assumes the possibility 
of predicting and mitigating adverse impacts well in advance of the commencement of a 
project.   Therefore, legal frameworks for transboundary cooperation must evolve to create 
suitably empowered and capacitated institutions employing highly sophisticated procedures for 
inter-State engagement over shared water resources. Legal arrangements reflecting such an 
approach would accommodate uncertainty through flexible decision-making procedures which 
permit ‘incremental and gradual changes that transition experimentally to new standards or 
arrangements, while monitoring, assessing and adjusting these changes and their effects’.lxiv 
Though this will inevitably present significant challenges for the procedural and institutional 
arrangements currently prevailing in international water law, the requirement for adaptive 
governance aiming to ensure ecological resilience is not without some legal authority.  Strong 




lxv and the former can be regarded as a means of 
implementing the latter,lxvi which enjoys extensive support as customary law.   The inverse 
is also true, as precaution is central to implementation of any adaptive management technique.  
Precaution is commonly understood to be an integral aspect of the application of the ecosystem 
approach, which can itself in turn be legally justified as a precautionary measure.   Of course, 
the ecosystem approach may already enjoy autonomous legal authority, at least in the field of 
international watercourses.lxix  Consistent ICJ endorsement in transboundary watercourses cases 
of a requirement for ‘continuing’ environmental assessment might amount to judicial 
recognition of the important role of adaptive ecosystem-based management in certain situations 
of scientific uncertainty. The Court stated unequivocally in Pulp Mills that ‘once operations 
have started and, where necessary, throughout the life of the project, continuous monitoring of 
its effects on the environment shall be undertaken’,lxx thereby building upon Judge 
Weeramantry’s earlier endorsement in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros of the “Principle of Continuing 
Environmental Impact Assessment”.lxxi  
Broad Stakeholder Participation 
Though Rio Principle 10 proclaims a general principle of public participation,lxxii
lxxiii
lxxiv
 which is 
equally applicable to the management of shared transboundary water resources  and might 
reasonably be considered to reflect established customary international law,  international 
water agreements which include an express requirement concerning the involvement of 
stakeholders or the wider public are relatively rare. In this regard, international water law 
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appears out of step with developments in general international law.  For example, Article 13 of 
the International Law Commission (ILC) 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm from Hazardous Activities includes an obligation to consult affected populations within 
any process facilitating transboundary EIA, and the commentary thereto makes it quite clear 
that, in addition to the provision of information to the public, it would require States ‘to 
ascertain the view of the public’ likely to be affected, as ‘[w]ithout that second step, the purpose 
of the article would be defeated’.lxxv 
Conventional international water law’s focus upon inter-State engagement to the exclusion of 
meaningful public participation is epitomised by Part III of the UN Watercourses Convention, 
containing detailed rules on all aspects of inter-State notification of planned measures, reply to 







  Similarly, Article 9 of the Convention only provides for the regular exchange of 
data and information at the inter-State level, neglecting to say anything about public or 
stakeholder access. Though the UNECE Water Convention is regarded as ‘arguably leading the 
charge on producing instruments which strengthen joint institutions and stakeholder 
participation’,  the Convention itself only requires State parties to make information relating 
to the management of transboundary freshwater resources available to the public and says little 
about public participation.   Some European basin agreements inspired by the UNECE Water 
Convention have tended to take a similarly restrictive approach as regards public or stakeholder 
participation,  whilst others have sought to be more inclusive.lxxx There also exists a limited 
number of basin agreements from other regions, most notably in Africa, which expressly 
stipulate a requirement of public consultation, such as the 2004 ZAMCOM Agreement  and 
the 2003 Lake Tanganyika Convention.  
Public participation is clearly recognised as central to effective implementation of the 
ecosystem approach in the practice guidance developed under the Convention on Biological 




 principles identified at CBD COP 5 to guide implementation of the 
ecosystem approach, Principle 12 recommends the involvement of all sectors of society, while 
Principle 11 exhorts decision-makers to make use of all forms of information, including 
indigenous knowledge.   Similarly, Goal 2.5 of the CBD’s Revised Programme of Work on 
Inland Water Biological Diversity recommends broad engagement with ‘[r]elevant national 
stakeholders, including representatives of indigenous and local communities’.   Likewise, 
the 2004 guidelines on implementing the ecosystem approach adopted by CBD COP 7 
‘[r]ecommend that Parties and other Governments facilitate the full and effective participation 
of indigenous and local communities and other stakeholders’.  
It is worth noting, however, that, despite a dearth of treaty provisions expressly providing for 




 or promote  reliance upon EIA of planned projects in order to avoid and 
minimise adverse impacts and facilitate meaningful inter-State notification, as is now a 
‘requirement under general international law’  irrespective of its inclusion in an applicable 
conventional instrument, though the ICJ found that ‘no legal obligation to consult the affected 
populations arises for the Parties from the instruments invoked by Argentina’.  However, 
the Court also held that ‘it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation … the 
specific content of the environmental impact assessment required in each case’xc and one would 
struggle to find a national EIA regime where public or stakeholder participation is not a central 
11 
 
element. It is telling that the 1991 UNECE Convention on Transboundary Environmental Impact 
Assessment, which is intended to inform national development of ‘the necessary legal, 
administrative or other measures’ in respect of activities likely to cause significant adverse 
transboundary impact, requires that ‘[t]he concerned Parties shall arrange for distribution of 
the documentation to the authorities and the public of the affected Party in the areas likely to 
be affected and for the submission of comments to the competent authority of the Party of 
origin’.xci 
Of course, a significant number of international watercourses have in place permanent 
institutional structures, which may assist in facilitating structured stakeholder engagement. One 
commentator suggests that ‘practice shows that effective institutional management has a degree 
of flexibility that allows for public input’.
xciii
xcii  A comprehensive 2013 study of water-related 
institutional cooperation notes that ‘RBO s do not act in isolation in their respective river and 
lake basins’, but instead engage a range of external actors, including ‘NGO s, civil society 
groups, knowledge groups and research networks … as well as other regional institutions either 
directly dealing with water resources issues … or implicitly influencing river basin governance 
through their regional principles, norms, rules and activities’.   This is particularly important 
for effective ecosystems protection, for which 
‘effective governance requires a bottom-up approach, and one that often sits more easily 
with non-governmental organisations, working at the interface between state and 
society. Such “trusted intermediaries” can often work across national or sub-national 
boundaries with a greater flexibility than state bodies, building local consensus around 
environmental protection and enhancement, and ultimately ecosystem service 
delivery.’xciv 
However, if effective public or stakeholder participation is crucial for the protection of 
watercourse ecosystems, and for addressing the impacts of climate change, it is thus crucial for 
achieving optimal and sustainable utilisation of international watercourses.  It follows that is 
also critically important for the avoidance or resolution of international water disputes.  
Therefore, it is quite clear that the prevailing formal paradigm for procedural engagement in 
international water law, with its almost exclusive focus on inter-State communication, is not 
fit for purpose.  Discussing the ‘Effectiveness of Public Participation in Decision Making’ 
regarding shared international water resources, the chapter contained in the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment on ‘Freshwater Ecosystems’ provides an indication of the inherent 
complexity of the participation issues potentially arising: 
‘It may be limited by factors such as: geographic isolation, common in upper watershed 
areas; language and educational barriers; access to information that is timely and 
relevant; whether participation is made possible in the early phases of a process 
(planning and defining problems); whether the decision process provides an 
opportunity for deliberation and learning; and legal frameworks that define rights (land 
tenure, for example) and provide measures of recourse, all of which determine the 
relative bargaining power of various stakeholder s.xcv     
While participatory rights are developing rapidly within the related fields of human rights 
law xcviixcvi and environmental law,  it is clear that implementation of the ecosystem approach 
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will demand significant progressive advances in terms of the inclusiveness of the procedural 
rules employed in international water law. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The emerging challenges of the growing global water crisis were always likely to have 
profound implications for the structure and composition of international water law, which has 
until relatively recently served primarily to accommodate competing economic uses of shared 
international freshwater resources.  It is increasingly clear that wide-ranging ecosystems 
obligations will play a critical role in addressing such challenges and, as the normative 
parameters of applying an ecosystem approach to transboundary water management continue 
to take shape, the true nature of these implications are unfolding.  Though the indeterminate 
substantive rules of international water law, encompassing both the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation and the duty to prevent significant transboundary harm, appear to enjoy 
the flexibility to accommodate multi-faceted ecosystem concerns,xcviii the related procedural 
rules and institutional arrangements may struggle in this regard.  While the detailed procedural 
rules set out in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention are commonly regarded as the 
Convention’s crowning achievement, it appears that the emerging technical approaches and 
methodologies, which provide the ecosystem approach with normative meaning and facilitate 
its practical implementation in the specific context of shared waters, represent a significant 
challenge to established patterns of inter-State communication and engagement. 
Firstly, the requirement to adopt a precautionary ecosystem approach incorporating elements 
of adaptive management will be necessary in order to respond to the threat of climate change, 
to ever greater pressure upon watercourse ecosystems, and to improving scientific 
understanding of ecosystem dynamics and vulnerability.  This will require watercourse States 
to engage cooperatively in continuing environmental impact assessment, experimentation and 
monitoring, suggesting the need for much more sophisticated and intense inter-State procedural 
engagement, to ensure continuing communication of the results of structured and targeted 
monitoring, modelling and research.  Secondly, the participatory decision-making regarded as 
central to the adoption of an ecosystem approach will require a shift away from the current 
exclusive focus on inter-State communication towards procedural frameworks that ensure 
meaningful engagement with key stakeholders and the public. The modalities of such 
consultation are very much more complex, particularly at the transboundary level, and 
appropriate procedural frameworks will require a sophisticated approach, learned from fields 
such as human rights, to ensure open and equitable participation. Finally, the ever more urgent 
imperative of ensuring optimal and sustainable use of increasingly scarce water resources, 
combined with the emergence of elaborate ecosystem-based methodologies for identifying and 
valuing water-related interests and benefits, will encourage States to resort more to benefit-
sharing in the cooperative management of shared water resources. Such arrangements will also 
demand a sophistication in the supporting rules and mechanisms for procedural engagement 
quite unlike anything available among today’s established procedural frameworks. 
The emerging ecosystem approach offers the prospect of a new water resources management 
paradigm which can assist watercourse States to avoid or resolve the international water-related 
13 
 
disputes likely to arise in an increasingly water-scarce world. However, its effective 
deployment will require significant upgrading of the supporting procedural rules of 
international water law.  In addition, truly robust river basin institutions have a pivotal role to 
play, as only these can initiate and foster the deep cooperative practice amongst States needed 
to provide the requisite degree of normative clarity through de facto elaboration of the key 
principles of international water law.   
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